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were to be used in connection with a particular investigation, they would seem not to
be a "fishing expedition," but a reasonable demand and therefore within the Fourth
Amendment.2s

Evidence-Wrongful Death-Admissibility of Plaintiff's Evidence on Deceased's
Careful Habits-[Illinois].-In an action for the death of the plaintiff's intestate,
struck by the defendant's automobile, the plaintiff called the defendant who testified
fully on the accident. There were no other eyewitnesses. Later the plaintiff introduced
evidence on the careful habits of his intestate to prove freedom from contributory
negligence. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, held, reversed. The habit
evidence should have been excluded as the defendant, called by the plaintiff, was an
eyewitness. Scally v. Flannery.,
The instant decision might well have been expected, for logical conclusions to be
drawn from the Illinois cases practically preclude the effective use of habit evidence
to show freedom from contributory negligence in any case in which the defendant has
seen the accident. In the recent case of Nordman v. Carlson,2 where the plaintiff had
declined to call the defendant as an eyewitness, evidence of the careful habits of the
deceased was admitted. The decision was based on the ground that such evidence is
rendered inadmissible only by the availability of a competent eyewitness and that the
defendant was rendered incompetent by the Illinois "dead man" statute.3 There is
Illinois authority, however, to the effect that if the plaintiff or another person interested in the estate testifies to the careful habits of the deceased on the issue of freedom
from contributory negligence, such testimony is evidence of a "transaction"4 between
the defendant and the deceased and removes the defendant's incompetency.S If this
authority were followed the defendant could testify, and then logically the habit evidence originally admitted would have to be stricken.6 Upon this analysis, the defendant's testimony, since rendered admissible only by that of the plaintiff, should also
be stricken. This peculiar result might best be avoided by deeming the defendant's
objection to the plaintiff's habit evidence waived by the introduction of direct evidence
based on its admission.
The general rule that habit evidence is inadmissible if testimony of credible eyewitnesses' is available8 seems perfectly sound. The probative value of a general habit
2- Cf. Hearst v. Black, 87 F. (2d) 68 (App. D.C. 1936), noted 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1383 (1937);
see also Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924); 36
Col. L. Rev. 84 (1936).
' 292 Ill. App. 349, xi N.E. (2d) 123 (,937).
2 291 III. App. 438, io N.E. (2d) 53 (1937).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 51, § 2.

4An accident is a "transaction" within the meaning of the statute. Van Meter v. Gold£ arb, 217 Ill. 620, 148 N.E. 391 (1925).
s Rouse v. Tomasek, 279 Ill. App. 557 (i935).
6Moore v. Bloomington D. & C. R. Co., 295 Ill. 63, 128 N.E.
299 Ill. 552, 132 N.E. 779 (1921).

721 (1920);

Soucie v. Payne,

7 The problem of whether a person is an eyewitness has raised some difficulty: One who
saw the deceased shortly before or after the accident has been held to be an eyewitness.
Cox v. Chicago & N.W.R.Co., 9 Ill. App. iS (igoo); Anderson v. Metropolitan W.S.E. Co.,
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of care on the issue of a specific act or forebearance, is so slight9 that many jurisdictions
refuse to admit it under any circumstances.- o And in the jurisdictions which permit
its introduction, it is confined to such cases of necessity as those in which no direct
evidence is availablelt or direct evidence is in conflict.12 This necessity does not exist
upon the question of contributory negligence if there were disinterested eyewitnesses
to the occurrence. To enforce this limitation, however, where the only eyewitness is
the defendant, thus forcing the plaintiff as in the instant case to rely solely on a hostile
witness, seems unjust, for the policy of equality which underlies the "dead man"
statutes 3 demands the contrary. The harshness of this enforcement is greatly increased in a jurisdiction, such as Illinois,4 which places the burden on the plaintiff to
disprove contributory negligence.'s The burden of proving a negative is substantial in
itself. As long as the only eyewitness is the defendant, the plaintiff will be virtually
unable to establish a prima facie case. 6 Especially is this true in Illinois where the
170 Ill. App. 210 (1912). Contra: Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend, 107 Ill. 44 (883); Smith v.
Kewanee L. & P. R. Co., 175 111. App. 354 (1902). One who saw only part of the circumstances
leading to the accident is generally held not to be an eyewitness. Noonan v. Maus, i97 Ill.
App. 1o3 (igiS); Wallis v. Southern P. R. Co., 184 Cal. 662, i95 Pac. 408 (1921); Fiske v.
Atchinson T. & S. Fe R. Co., go Kan. 409, 133 Pac. 871 (19z3); Tucker v. Boston & Me. R.
Co., 73 N.H. 132, 59 Ad. 943 (igo5). On the issue of drunkenness of the deceased, onewho saw
him shortly before the accident was held an eyewitness. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Pearson, 184
Ill. 386, 56 N.E. 633 (igoo); Lane v. Missouri P. R. Co., 132 Mo. 4, 33 S.W. 645 (1895);
Bedenbaugh v. Southern R. Co., 69 S.C. 1, 48 S.E. 53 (904). Where the question is in doubt
the testimony of the witness is disregarded. Ill. C. R. Co. v. Ashline, 171 Ill. 313, 49 N.E. 521
(1898); or left to the jury. Platter v. Minn. & St. L. R. Co., 162 Iowa

142, 143

N.W. 992 (I913).

8 Gay v. Winter, 34 Cal 153 (1867); Hussey v. Boston & Me. R. Co., 82 N.H. 236, 133

At. 9 (1926); Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., v. Clark io8 Ill. i3
§ 65 (2d ed. 1923).

(1883); 1 Wigmore, Evidence

9 1 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 64, 65.
xoParsons v. Syracuse & N. Y. R. Co., 2o5 N.Y. 226, 98 N.E. 331 (i912); Mullen v. Mohican
Co., 97 Conn. 107, ri5 Atl. 685 (1921); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Adams' Admr., 205 Ky. 203,
265 S. W. 623 (1924); 1 Wigmore, loc. cit. supra note 8.
-Armstrong v. C. & W. I. R. Co., 350 Ill. 426, 183 N.E. 478 (1932); Frederickson v. Iowa
C. R. Co., i56 Iowa 26, 135 N.W. 12 (1912); Clark v. Detroit R. Co., 197 Mich. 489, 163 N.W.
964 (1917); Overman Wheel Co. v. Griffin, 67 Fed. 659 (C.C.A. ist 1895); Hussey v. Boston &
Me. R. Co., 82 N.H. 236, 133 AtU. 9 (1926).
2 Cleveland C.C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Keenan, 190 Ill. 217, 6o N.E. 107 (igoi); Parkinson v.
Nashua & L. R. Co., 6i N.H. 416 (i88i); Enright v. Atlanta, 78 Ga. 288 (i886); Allard v.
Northwestern Contract Co., 64 Wash. 14, i6 Pac. 457 (1911).
'3 "The purpose... is to.. . put the two parties in a suit upon terms of equality in regard
.to the opportunity of giving testimony." Van Meter v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620, 623, 148 N.E.
391, 392 (1925). See also Nordman v. Carlson, 291 Ill. App. 438, 442, io N.E. (2d) 53, 55
(1937)14North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Louis, 138 Ill. 9, 27 N.E. 451 (i89i); Newell v. Cleveland,
C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 261 Ill. 505, 1o4 N.E. 223 (1914).
'S For other jurisdictions having this rule see 4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 8, § 2507.
z6Morris v. East Haven, 41 Conn. 252 (1874); Mullen v. Mohican Co., 97 Conn. 107, 115
At. 685 (1921); Gray v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 143 Iowa 268, 12x N.WV. 1097 (1909).
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usual presumption of due care on the part of the deceased in a wrongful death action
apparently does not exist.'7 Thus, it would seem that the eyewitness rule should not
bar habit evidence where the sole eyewitness is interested adversely to the plaintiff.
Family Relations-InterVivos Transfers-Protection of Spouse's Statutory Share
-[New York].-Three days before his death, the husband transferred all his real and
personal property in trust, reserving income for life, power of revocation, and control
of the trustees as to the adninistration of the trust. The trial court refused to enforce
the trust as against the widow's claim for her statutory share in her husband's estate.,
On appeal, held, affirmed. The husband's transfer was "illusory" in respect to the
widow's marital rights. Newman v. Dore.2
In place of common law dower and curtesy, many states have substituted legislation which gives the surviving spouse, even against a will, a percentage of the decedent's personal and real property remaining in the estate at the time of his or her
death.3 While the general policy motivating these statutes was to protect the spouse
against disinheritance, the effectiveness of such statutes largely depends upon the
extent to which either spouse is permitted to alienate his or her property during life.
The statutes are generally silent on the problem of inter vivos transfers; and in order to
give effect to the policy behind these statutes the courts have sometimes been compelled to nullify transfers made during coverture.
Such relief has been predicated upon two distinct grounds: (i) the subjective intent
primarily to defeat the marital rights of the surviving spouse rather than to benefit
the person to whom the property is given; or (2) the failure of the transferor to relinquish in part or in whole the incidents of ownership. Under the first theory, followed
in a minority of jurisdictions, the main problem turns upon evidence of the transferor's
intent.4 Where definite evidence is lacking, the protection afforded the surviving
spouse depends upon the presumptions invoked by the court. Thus, in Murray v.
Murrays the court held that a presumption of an intent to defeat the widow's share
arose where the gift constituted a principal part of the husband's estate. In Vermont,
contrary to earlier decisions, 6 no presumptions are raised from the fact that the natural
'7 Contrast the refusal of the trial court to grant an instruction in accord with this presump273, 8 N.E. (2d) 620 (i937), with
tion, as indicated by the record in Blumb v. Getz, 366 Ill.
Anderson v. C.R.I. &P. Ry. Co. i8g Iowa 739, 175 N.W. 583 (1920); Gembolis v. Rydeski, 258
Mich. 521, 243 N.W. 44 (1932); 6 Iowa L. Bull. 55 (1920); Cf. 44 Harv. L. Rev. 292 (1930).
Cahill's Cons1. Laws N.Y. 1930, c. 13, §§ i8, 83.
2 275 N.Y.371, 9 N.E.(2d)9 66 (i937); noted 37 Col. L. Rev. 1219 (1937), 7 Brooklyn L.

Rev. 241 (7937).

33 Vernier, American Family Laws §§ i88, 189 (i935). These statutes establish a "legitime
portion" for the surviving spouse, analogous to that of the Civil Law. See note 24 infra.
4 Evans v. Evans, 78 N.H. 352, oo At. 671 (,9,7); Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, i8
AUt. 153 (i889); Manikee v. Beard, 85 Ky. 20, 2 S.W. 545 (1887); see notes 5-7 infra.
s9o Ky. i, 13 S.W. 244 (i8go); see also Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W. (2d) 2
(1930).
6
Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107 (1842); Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 18 Ad. 153 (1889)

(mere gratuitous transfer is presumptively fraudulent).

